, and historical-ideological (Cohen, 1970; Deutscher, 1968; Harkabi, 1967a Harkabi, , 1968 
chosocial bases of behaviors in this conflict, and to clarify evidence related to major propositions regarding the impact of those bases. Its scope is limited by accepting the basic caveats of Kelman (1965a) and Etzioni (1969) . Kelman (1965a) makes clear that while we can use sociopsychological data to contribute to our understanding of a conflict, it cannot replace looking at the real issues and giving due regard to historical and political contexts. Etzioni (1969) suggests that sociopsychological knowledge can help clarify specific subproblems, but psychological studies cover only a segment of the behavior in international conflict.
Attempts to deal with the history and present status of the conflict from a psychological perspective can be classified into three groups: psychological-theoretical (Liff, 1971; Tamarin, 1968a) , psYchologi~l-empirical (Newnham, 1967; Sanua, 1970 Sanua, , 1971 , and historical-ideological (Cohen, 1970; Deutscher, 1968; Harkabi, 1967a Harkabi, , 1968 Sanua (1970, 1971, 1966) is the major proponent of the Arab personality as a major factor in the conflict. Sanua's main contention is that &dquo;... the limitations of the Arab character have brought them (i.e. the Arabs) to their present predicament&dquo; (1970, p. 3). He Sanua (1970) and others (Adams, 1957; Feldman, 1958; Gillespie and Allport, 1955) , is extreme suspiciousness stemming from child rearing practices (cf. MacLeod, 1959) and directed towards fellow Arabs and foreigners alike. Sanua (1966) Prothro and Melikian (1952) and Melikan (1959b) at the American University of Beirut. Melikian (1956) and Prothro and Melikian (1953) (Melikian, 1959a) showed similar results. Melikian (1959a) (1963) . Khatchadorian (1961) Glidden (1972) and Racy (1970) (Chejne, 1965; Harkabi, 1967b; Salem, 1958) . Chejne (1965) (Labban, 1960; Melikian, 1960) is added to that of representation. Reliance on the writer's personal observations and knowledge of popular literature (Hamady, 1960) (Sanua, 1971 (Herman, 1970) Loewenstein (1951) . Among these are restlessness, a sense of inferiority, skepticism, and mistrust of Gentiles. Khouri (1971) Khouri (1971) and Rogers (1971 Tamarin (1968b Tamarin ( , 1971a Tamarin ( , 1971b (Peres, 1971a) . These findings seem to parallel those by Hofman (1971) Viewing the conflict as a clash between a traditional and a modern culture has been, for a wide range of writers (e.g., Patai, 1961) , an easy way of conceptualizing it (Avirneri, 1970) . The cultural gap between the Arabs and the Israelis has most often been mentioned as a factor in Arab military defeats (Zuraiq, 1967; Harkabi, 1967b (Avineri, 1970) . Implicit in this view are certain assumptions regarding the sources of Arab behavior in the conflict, namely generalized frustration and backwardness (cf. Sharabi, 1970) .
The modernization hypothesis spelled out in terms of better education and a higher standard of living is central to expressed Israeli hopes for peace (cf. Ben-Gurion, 1971 ). Operationally, the prediction has been that as Arabs become more modernized, better educated (less religious?), and more advanced economically, they will be more compromising vis-a-vis Israel. Behind it was not only a hypothesis relating Arab behavior to various objective frustrations, but also another hypothesis relating more &dquo;rational&dquo; compromising behavior to modernization.
Data on the effects of relative modernization on the attitudes of Israeli Arabs (Landau, 1969; Peres, 1971b) indicate clearly that these optimistic predictions have not been borne out by reality. Israeli Arabs acknowledge the role of the Israeli government in their modernization, and the necessity of acquiring modern technology (Peres, 1971b (Harkabi, 1968; Tamarin, 1971a Tamarin, , 1971b (Harkabi, 1967a) .
The seeming decline in the importance of religion, as measured by the decline in observance on the Israeli side (Herman, 1970) , and in the decrease in discussions of the conflict in a religious context on the Arab side (Harkabi, 1968) (Tamarin, 197 la, 1971b) . The Israeli occupation of &dquo;holy places&dquo; seems to have driven home the basic religious-mystical message of Zionism (Harkabi, 1967a) , and religious arguments are being used in favor of noncompromising positions (Rubinstein, 1971 (Benjamin, 1971 Some psychosocial overviews of the conflict (e g., Sanua, 1971; Glidden, 1972) Understanding the sociopsychological processes is necessary for a full and complete resolution but is not its basis. Given the reviews by Kelman (1965a Kelman ( , 1965b (Cohen, 1970 (Bruhus. 1955; Dodd and Barakat, 1970) Debbiny, 1970; Jiryis, 1968 Zweig (1969) . A look at the writings of Israeli ideologists suggest the need for a careful study of the language, especially in view of the use of Old Testament references, messianic ideas, and a terminology of &dquo;mission&dquo; and &dquo;destiny&dquo; (Ben-Gurion, 1958; Baal-Theshuva, 1963; Davis, 1956 ).
If we consider the system of participants in this conflict at various levels of involvement, we are impressed with the dearth of psychosocial data covering them and the lack of differentiation among subgroups.
There is little differentiation in the literature among subgroups in the Arab world, and lack of appreciation of the complexities of large subgroups on both sides (e.g., Oriental
Jews in Israel and Palestinians in the Arab world).
One of the main priorities of future work should be the investigation of those differences among subgroups. Most of the approaches presented in this review were global and comprehensive. Any attempts at more specific and selective conceptualizations should help in determining how important any of the selected issues are in the future course and eventual resolution of this conflict.
